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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
TRACY MICAH ALLRED,

Case No. 20010113-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/ Appellant.

AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT
In accordance with the order of this Court dated 26 November 2001,1 Appellant
Tracy Micah Allred ["Mr. Allred"] submits this Amended Brief of Appellant. This
Amended Brief of Appellant replaces the Brief of Appellant in its entirety.2

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction3 for Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 2001), in the Third Judicial District Court,

1

A Copy of the Order is included in Addendum A.

2

After the Brief of Appellant was filed and the State issued its response, Mr. Allred
submitted a motion to supplement the record with the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The
motion is included in Addendum B. The State's Response is included in Addendum C. This
Court granted the motion.
3

A copy of the "Minutes: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment," R. 156-57, is attached in
Addendum D.

State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Judge, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(Supp.2001).

STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Did the trial court err in failing to suppress evidence of Mr. Allred's post-Miranda
confession, which was coerced by police officers' threat to bring a fierce dog to the scene
and tainted by the effects of an involuntary pre-Miranda confession?
Standard of Review: In reviewing a trial court's determination on the voluntariness of a
confession, a bifurcated standard of review applies. State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 892
(Utah 1993). "Under the bifurcated standard, the ultimate determination of whether a
confession is voluntary is a legal question, and we review the trial court's ruling for
correctness." Id. "To the extent the trial court has made subsidiary factual findings,
however, those findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id.
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 32-35, 188 [23-33].

STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Allred's motion for a mistrial where two
police officers testified, in violation of a pre-trial stipulation by counsel, that there were
car stereos and tools inside the black, briefcase-style bag, and also that Mr. Allred's
2

Miranda rights had been read to him on a prior occasion?
Standard of Review: At the trial level, a trial court should deny a motion for a mistrial if
it concludes that the incident objected to "probably did not prejudice the jury." State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997). "'Once the trial court has exercised [its]
discretion and made [its] judgment thereon, the prerogative of this court on review is
much more limited.'" Id. at 1231 (citation omitted). "Unless a review of the record shows
that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury
that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, we will not find that the court's
decision was an abuse of discretion." Id.
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 190 [224-25].

STATEMENT OF THE THIRD ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Did the trial court err in excluding excited utterance evidence showing that another
individual arrived on the scene after Mr. Allred had been arrested, claimed ownership of
the bag, and expressed anger that the bag was missing?
Standard of Review: In general, a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of
evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. West Valley City v. Hutto, 2000
UT App 188, H 9, 5 P.3d 1 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994)).
However, "difficulty arises because the exceptions to the hearsay rule listed in rule 803
vary as to whether the trial court's analysis involves a factual or legal determination or

3

some combination thereof." Hanson v. Heath. 852 P.2d 977, 978 (Utah 1993). Thus, "the
appropriate standard of review of a trial court's decision admitting or excluding evidence
under rules 802 and 803 depends upon the particular ruling in dispute." Id. In this case,
the trial court did not make any findings of fact. R. 191 [293-95, 301-05]. Instead, the
trial court based its ruling upon legal conclusions regarding the relevant factors to be
considered under Rule 803(2). R. 191 [293-95, 301-05]. Therefore, the court's exclusion
of this evidence should be reviewed under the less deferential correctness standard. Salt
Lake City v. Mires. 2000 UT App 244, If 8, 9 P.3d 769.
Preervation: This issue was preserved at R. 191 [296-98].

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES OF EVIDENCE
The following provision from the United States Constitution is relevant on appeal.
The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
. . . nor shall any person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .
U.S. Const, amend V.
The following provision from the United States Constitution is relevant on appeal.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1.

4

The following provision from the Utah Constitution is relevant on appeal. Article
I, section 12 provides, in pertinent part:
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
hi wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
The following rule of evidence is relevant on appeal:
Character Evidence Not Admissible, Utah R.Evid. 404(b) (2001).
The full text of this rule is provided in Addendum E.
The following rule of evidence is relevant on appeal:
Hearsay Exceptions, Utah R.Evid. 803(2) (2001).
The full text of this rule is provided in Addendum F.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 9 June 2000 Mr. Allred was arrested at Liberty Park after claiming ownership
of a bag containing contraband. R. 14-15, 190 [166-69]. An Information charging him
with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute was
subsequently filed. R. 3-5.
Prior to trial, Mr. Allred filed a motion to suppress evidence of two confessions he
made to police at the time of his arrest. R. 32. He pointed out that, immediately before he
made the confessions the police had threatened to bring a fierce canine to the scene. R.
33. Mr. Allred claimed ownership of the bag of contraband to avoid being harmed by the
5

police dog. Id. Thus, the statements were coerced and were obtained in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. R. 32.
The trial court ruled that Mr. Alfred's first statement claiming ownership of the
bag was inadmissible at trial because it was made prior to the Miranda warnings. R. 177.
However, the court found that the first statement was not coerced, R. 177, and therefore it
did not "sufficiently taint the investigatory process so as to render ineffective [Mr.
Alfred's] subsequent waiver" of his Miranda rights by making a post-Miranda
confession. R. 178. Therefore, the trial court ruled, the second statement was admissible.
Also prior to trial, the State stipulated that its witnesses would not identify some of
the items found in the bag with the marijuana, including car stereos and face plates from
stereos. R. 190 [14-15]. However, at trial Officer Derick Dimond ["Officer Dimond"]
testified that some car stereos had been found inside the bag. R. 190 [133]. Officer Bruce
Evans ["Officer Evans"] testified that some stereos and tools had been found inside the
bag. R. 190 [165]. In further violation of Rule of Evidence 404(b), Officer Evans testified
that when he arrested Mr. Alfred, Mr. Alfred stated that his Miranda rights had been read
to him on a prior occasion. R. 190 [167].
On the basis of these statements, the defense counsel motioned for a mistrial. R.
190 [224-25]. The trial court denied the motion, indicating that counsels' stipulation
specified that "there would be absolutely no inference or follow-up on the potential
source of the stereos," but that the stereos could be mentioned. R. 190 [230-31]. The
court also indicated that it did not remember the testimony about Mr. Alfred's previous
6

Miranda experience, and opined that the jury probably did not notice the statement. R.
190 [227]. The court also offered to give a curative instruction. Id. The defense counsel
declined to avoid drawing further attention to the statement. Id.
Finally, the trial court excluded evidence that a man named "Clay" arrived on the
scene approximately one and a half hours after Mr. Allred was arrested, discovered that
the bag was gone, and claimed "[t]he bag was mine. That stuff was mine." R. 191 [296].
He was "yelling and swearing, and he was just pretty much mad." R. 191 [287]. The
defense counsel argued that these statements were admissible as excited utterances. R.
191 [296-97]. The trial court, expressing concern that this evidence had not been
previously heard by the State, R. 191 [290-91], and questioning reliability, R. 191 [29495], ruled that the evidence was hearsay. R. 191 [301-02].
Mr. Allred was convicted as charged. R. 148. He filed a timely notice of appeal.
R. 159-60.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Early in the evening of 9 June 2000, Sonya Ortiz ["Ms. Ortiz"] went to Liberty
Park with two girlfriends, "Crystal" and "Megan." R. 191 [272]. They started talking to a
"group of guys" near the basketball courts. R. 191 [273]. Ms. Ortiz had not met any of
the guys before. IdL There were at least five guys in the group, and one of them was Mr.
Allred. Id The girls and guys sat on a picnic table as they chatted. R. 191 [273-74].
After fifteen or twenty minutes, a Salt Lake City police car entered the park from
7

the north, drove around the perimeter of the park, and approached the basketball courts.
R. 190 [139-40], 191 [274]. Ms. Ortiz and her two girlfriends remained at the table. R.
191 [276]. All but three of the guys left. Id One of the guys who left was named Clay. R.
191 [281]. Mr. Allred was among the guys who stayed. Id.
Officer Evans and Officer Dimond emerged from the police car and approached
the table. R. 191 [274-75]. The officers were dressed as gang officers in black polo shirts
with short sleeves and letters across the back saying "Salt Lake City Police Gang Unit."
R. 190 [137]. The uniform included black pants, black boots, and a belt with a gun and
holster, pager, and other equipment. R. 190 [137-38], 191 [275].
Officer Evans said that there had been problems in the area with drug activity, and
asked if anyone at the table knew anything about such problems. R. 190 [163], 191 [276].
Everyone responded negatively. R. 190 [163]. Then the officers asked everyone for
identification or for their names and dates of birth. R. 190 [143]. Everyone provided
either identification or information, and the officers called it in to the dispatcher to
determine whether anybody had an outstanding warrant. R. 190 [143-44]. No warrants
were reported, and so the officers decided to leave. R. 190 [144, 163-64].
Out of the corner of his eye, Officer Evans noticed a black, briefcase-style bag at
the end of the picnic table, only a couple of feet from the three girls at the table. R. 201
[6, 23-24]. The three guys, including Mr. Allred, were sitting further away from the bag.
Id. The bag was underneath the table on the same side as the boys, but it was at least five
feet away from them. Id
8

The officers began questioning everyone about the bag. Id. at 7, 24. First, they
asked each person at the table whether the bag was his or hers. IdL 7, 24-25. When no one
claimed it, Officer Evans questioned those playing basketball nearby. R. 190 [164].
Officer Dimond looked in the bag for some identification and found three plastic bags
containing a substance which he suspected to be marijuana. R. 190 [133-34]. The police
testified that car stereos and tools were also found in the bag, as well as 82 small baggies.
R. 190 [133, 165-66].
While Officer Dimond remained with the bag, Officer Evans took each person at
the table aside for questioning.4 He asked each person privately whether he or she knew
who owned the bag or whether he or she could identify the owner. R. 201 [25]. No one
claimed ownership of the bag, and no one knew the identity of the owner. Id. at 26. At
one point, Ms. Ortiz and one of her friends attempted to get a drink and visit the
restroom, but the officers prevented them from leaving. The officers asked Ms. Ortiz and
her two friends to empty their pockets. R. 191 [278-79]. The officers also searched the
girls' purses. R. 191 [279]. A Terry frisk was performed on Mr. Allred to determine
whether he had any weapons. However, the officers found no weapons or contraband. R.
174. Then the officers indicated that if nobody claimed the bag, everyone at the table
would get tickets for possession of marijuana and have to go to court. R. 191 [280].
Officer Evans testified that the following then occurred:

4

R. 190 [146-47, 177]. Each person was taken about ten or fifteen feet away from the
others at the picnic table for questioning. R. 190 [177].
9

I just, I asked, you know, if they'd tell me whose bag it is. If not maybe I'd
have to get, we'd get a dog over here that would sniff the bag and would be able to
sniff the person and tell who the bag belongs to.
R. 201 [29]. In front of the group, the officers discussed canines and indicated that they
were "mean."5 Officer Evans also testified:
I did mention to Officer Diamond about - let's see, yeah, I think I
mentioned it to him that in the county, that the county officer and their dog
found drugs in someone, I guess, in the backside of someone. He had put
i[t] down his pants and the dog had found it and was nippin' at his
backside.
Q [defense counsel]: And you did that, again, in front of the six
individuals?
A: Correct.
Q: And it was after that point, after the discussion that you and [0]fficer
Diamond had about the dogs and the various things you've just testified
about that Mr. Allred said, "The bag's mine"?
A: Well, yeah, Officer Diamond talked to him and I wasn't sure, I didn't
hear exactly how that conversation went.
Q: But it's your understanding that that conversation with Officer Diamond
is when Mr. Allred said the bag was his.
A: Correct.
Id at 30.
After his confession, Mr. Allred was immediately arrested and Officer Evans read

5

Id. at 30. The officers discussed two types of dogs. R. 190 [149, 153-54]. One type, the
bloodhound, is a friendly dog and is used to track. R. 190 [154]. The other type, the canine, or
German Shepherd, is used for both tracking and apprehending fleeing suspects. Id German
Shepherds may be mean and may bite suspects who have marijuana hidden on their body. Id. at
179.
10

him his Miranda rights. R. 190 [166-68]. About that time, "Officer Serio" arrived with a
police dog. R. 201 [33]. Mr. Alfred's five companions left, and Officer Evans "talked
with [Mr. Allred] right there at the table." Id. at 33. Officer Diamond stood nearby. Id at
34. At one point, Officer Serio let the dog out of the car. Id at 35. Officer Serio took the
dog all around the area and let him "sniff around." R. 188 [15]. Officer Evans said that
Mr. Allred indicated that the green, leafy substance in the bag was marijuana. R. 201
[32]. Officer Evans also testified that Mr. Allred said he was selling marijuana because he
was unable to get a job. Id. The conversation lasted ten to fifteen minutes. Id. at 35. The
police thoroughly searched Mr. Allred and found fifty-five dollars in cash and a cell
phone. R. 190 [180-81]. Then he was transported to jail. R. 190 [156].
Ms. Ortiz testified that about an hour to an hour and a half later, Clay, who had
left the scene earlier, returned. R. 191 [281]. He was angry. R. 191 [282]. He was
"yelling and swearing, and he was just pretty much mad."6 Ms. Ortiz did not know Clay,
has not spoken with him since the day Mr. Allred was arrested, and does not know where
he lives. R. 91 [287-88].

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Mr. Allred's two confessions were coerced by police threats to bring a fierce
German Shepherd, which had previously bitten a suspect, to the scene. The trial court
6

R. 191 [287]. Although Ms. Ortiz was not allowed to testify that Clay claimed
ownership of the bag and its contents, R. 191 [281-90], she was allowed to testify that a man
named Clay arrived and was angry. Id
11

properly suppressed evidence of the first confession, but erred in failing to suppress
evidence of the post-Miranda confession. The post-Miranda confession should have been
suppressed because it was tainted by the effects of the involuntary pre-Miranda
confession, and because the coerciveness of the circumstances escalated after the
Miranda warnings were given. After the warnings, a police dog arrived on the scene, R.
201 [33], enhancing the effect of the officers' earlier threat to call in a fierce dog. The
dog was allowed out of the car to sniff the area. Id. at 35. Mr. Allred sat with the same
officers and at the same picnic table where he had given his pre-Miranda confession
minutes earlier, and indicated the marijuana was his. R. 190 [168]. This confession was
not attenuated from the first confession, and it was given circumstances which were
coercive in their own right. The post-Miranda confession is not reliable and should have
been suppressed.
Further, Mr. Allred's conviction should be reversed without reference to the harm
that resonated from his probative and damaging confession. Under article I, section 12 of
the Utah Constitution, a showing of harmfulness is not required. The plain language of
this provision is broader than its federal counterpart and provides greater protection to
Utahns. Further, at the time the provision was adopted by the Utah constitutional framers,
it was well established that constitutional errors resulted in automatic reversals. Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced
Confessions, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 152, 156-57 (1991). This was the intent of the framers,
and they could not have foreseen that a harmfulness analysis would apply to the federal
12

counterpart a century later. Arizona v. Fulmininate, 499 U.S. 279, 310-12 (1991). Finally,
as recognized by the Tennessee Supreme Court in holding that a harmless error analysis
did not apply under its state constitutional provision, police will not be deterred from
violating the constitution if coerced confessions are brushed aside under the harmlessness
rationale. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 94 (Tenn. 2001). Thus, Mr. Allred's conviction
should be reversed without reference to harm.
The trial court also erred in failing to grant Mr. Allred's motion for a mistrial after
the State presented evidence, in violation of a pre-trial stipulation by counsel, that stereos
and tools were found in the bag with the marijuana, and that Mr. Allred had been read his
Miranda rights on a prior occasion. Counsels' pretrial stipulation contemplated that the
stereos would not be mentioned at all, R. 190 [14-15], and the trial court overlooked this
in denying Mr. Allred's motion for a mistrial. Additionally, neither evidence of the
stereos nor evidence of Mr. Allred's prior Miranda experience was proper under Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This evidence was not offered for a "proper,
noncharacter purpose,..." State v. Webster, 2000 UT App 238,1J31, 32 P.3d 976
(quoting State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, Tf 20, 993 P.2d 837). It was offered only to
disgrace Mr. Allred as "a person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and
thus likely to have committed the crime charged." State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882
(Utah 1978).
The third issue involves the trial court's failure to admit evidence that another
individual, Clay, arrived after Mr. Allred had been arrested, became angry when he
13

discovered that the bag of contraband was gone, and claimed ownership of the bag. This
evidence was admissible as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence because Clay's discovery placed him "under the stress of excitement," West
Valley City v. Hutto. 2000 UT App 188, ^ 15, 5 P.3d 1, and he admitted ownership of the
bag while in this state.

ARGUMENT
I. MR, ALLRED'S POST-MIRANDA CONFESSION SHOULD HAVE
BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE IT WAS COERCED AND IT WAS
TAINTED BY THE EFFECTS OF AN INVOLUNTARY PRE-MIRANDA
STATEMENT GIVEN MINUTES EARLIER
Police officers coerced Mr. Allred into claiming ownership of the black bag in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The trial court properly suppressed the preMiranda confession. R. 189 [2]. However, the court failed to suppress his post-Miranda
confession. Id This was error because the coercive effect of the pre-Miranda confession
had not dissipated, and the coerciveness of the confrontation actually escalated after the
Miranda warning was read.
Mr. Allred gave his first confession in response to the Officers' threat to bring a
fierce dog to the scene. R. 201 [29-30]. After Mr. Allred was arrested and received his
Miranda warning, the coercive nature of the circumstances immediately escalated. At the
request of the officers, Mr. Alfred's five companions left and Mr. Allred was alone with
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Officer Evans, Officer Diamond, and Officer Serio, who had just arrived with a police
dog. R. 190 [169], 201 [34-35]. Mr. Allred was apparently handcuffed at that point, R.
190 [167], but he remained seated at the same picnic table where he had given his preMiranda confession minutes earlier. R. 190 [169]. Officer Evans began speaking with
Mr. Allred, and the police dog was released from the car and began sniffing all around
the area. R. 201 [35]. Neither Officer Evans nor Officer Dimond withdrew the earlier
threat to bring a fierce dog, or assured Mr. Allred that he would not be confronted with a
fierce dog. Id. at 33-35. In these circumstances, Mr. Allred again told Officer Evans that
the green, leafy substance was marijuana and that he was selling it. IdL at 32. This
confession is not reliable and should have been suppressed along with the first
confession.
Case law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments began separately but has
converged in recent years to provide clear, basic rules protecting individuals from police
excesses that violate fundamental rights against self-incrimination and the deprivation of
due process.
The body of cases interpreting the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment began earlier. These cases established sound precedent barring the use of
confessions obtained by physical or mental coercion. Payne v. Arkansas. 356 U.S. 560,
561 (1951). Notably, in Payne v. Arkansas, a young black man with a fifth-grade
education, Id at 562, confessed to a homicide after the police chief threatened to let an
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angry mob inside the jail unless the defendant confessed.7 The United States Supreme
Court declared, "[t]hat petitioner was not physically tortured affords no answer to the
question whether the confession was coerced, for "[t]here is a torture of mind as well as
body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force.... A confession by which life
becomes forfeit must be the expression of free choice.'" Id. at 566-67 (quoting Watts v.
Indiana. 338 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949)). Significantly, Pavne v. Arkansas established that the
determination of whether a confession was coerced depends upon the totality of the
circumstances in which the confession was made. Id. at 562, 567.
Since Payne v. Arkansas, courts have considered a wide range of factors in
analyzing the totality of circumstances surrounding defendants' confessions. Factors such
as a defendant's subjective characteristics,8 the length and location of the interrogation,9
the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,10 the temporal proximity of the

7

Id at 564-65. The defendant was also held for two days without being charged, was
denied visits from family members, was denied permission to make a telephone call, was given
minimal food, and was transported to another jail without shoes or socks. Id. at 563-64.
8

See e.g.. Winthrow v. Williams. 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993)(recognizing defendant's
mental health as a relevant factor); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)
(considering defendant's educational and mental shortcomings); United States v. Haddon. 927
F.2d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 1991) (considering defendant's intoxication); State v. Bvbee. 2000 UT 43,
122, 1 P.3d 1087 (considering defendant's level of education); State v. Rettenberger. 1999 UT
80, Tf 37, 984 P.2d 1009 (considering subnormal intelligence); and State v. Piansiaksone. 954
P.2d 861, 866 (Utah 1998) (considering defendant's fatigue).
9

State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1995).

10

State v. Allen. 839 P.2d291, 301 (Utah 1992).
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illegality and the confession,11 the causal connection between illegal police conduct and
the confession,12 whether a defense attorney was present13 and, of course, the nature of
any coercive threats and promises,14 have played significant roles in the determination of
whether confessions have been voluntary. However, the determination has never "turned
on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each [case] reflects] a careful
scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances." Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 226. Ultimately,
the core question is whether a confession is the "free and unconstrained choice" of the
confessor. Id. at 225. If the State does not establish this by a preponderance of the
evidence,15 a defendant's right of due process has been violated and the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.16
The modern body of cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination began with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). There, the United
State Supreme Court explored the early history and purpose of the Fifth Amendment.

11

Allen, 839 P.2d at 226.

12

Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).

13

Bybee, 2000 UT 43,1[17.

14

Connelly. 479 U.S. at 167; United States v. Murphy. 763 F.2d 202, 204 (6th Cir. 1985);
Bvbee. 2000 UT 43, f 17; Rettenberger. 1999 UT 80, ^ 29-31; State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221, 227
(Utah 1989).
15

Lego v. Twomev. 404 U.S. 477,489 (1972).
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Strain. 779 P.2d at 227. As with most federal constitutional errors, the State can avoid
reversal by showing that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" with regard to the
outcome of the case. Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991).
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Quoting Brown v. Walker, the Court said:
While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and
freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating
evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection
with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to
him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the
witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him
into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so
painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials; notably in those of Sir
Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so
odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
Miranda. 384 U.S. at 442-43 (quoting Brown v. Walker. 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896)).
The Court concluded:
So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon
the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made
a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their
fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of
evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment.

Upon this foundation, the Court declared that questioning by police officers "after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way" must be proceeded by a statement of his rights. IdL at 444. That
statement must include a warning that the person "has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney . . . . " Id These rights may be waived, but only if the waiver
is made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. Further, "unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained
18

as a result of interrogation can be used against him." Id. at 479.
In cases that followed, the Court held that the failure to administer the Miranda
warnings creates a presumption that a confession was coerced17 and that any purported
waiver of Fifth Amendment rights must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.18
One significant case is Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314. In that case, police questioned
a suspect who admitted, prior to being read his Miranda rights, involvement in a home
burglary. LI at 301. After his Miranda rights were read, he added that he had known the
victims would be out of town and led burglars to the residence to show them how to enter
through a defective sliding glass door. Id. He also accepted payment from the burglars.
Id. The trial court excluded the defendant's initial statement, but allowed evidence of his
post-Miranda confession.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. The Court began its analysis by
reaffirming the presumption of coercion that attaches to any pre-Miranda confession. Id
at 306-07. The Court explained:
[fjailure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of
compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise
voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be
excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case,
Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant
who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.
Id at 307. However, the Court indicated, where a suspect has made a voluntary pre-

17

Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)

18

Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169.
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Miranda statement, a subsequent administration of Miranda warnings serves to remove
the conditions that rendered the pre-Miranda statement inadmissible. Id. at 314. The
suspect is invested with adequate knowledge of his rights, and his subsequent decision to
waive these rights could reasonably be deemed voluntary. Id. Therefore, a post-Miranda
statement is admissible absent a showing of coercion with regard to that statement.19
In State v. James, this Court examined a similar set of facts. Before Miranda
warnings were issued, a young Native American made incriminating statements about a
burglary to older, Caucasian interrogators. State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). The interrogators immediately administered the Miranda warnings. Id The
defendant indicated that he understood his rights and he again confessed to the burglary.

Id. This rationale has been rejected by other state appellate courts interpreting their
state constitutions. For instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that article I, section 9
of the Tennessee Constitution mandates that Tennessee follow the rationale of United States v.
Bayer, 311 U.S. 532, 540 (1947), which Elstad overruled. Baver embraced the "cat out of the
bag" theory which recognizes that:
after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what
the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical
disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The
secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked
upon as fruit of the first.
State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Baver, 311 U.S. at 540). Other states
declining to follow Elstad include Hawaii, State v. Pebria, 938 P.2d 1190 (Ha. Ct. App. 1997),
and Massachusetts. Com v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288 (Mass. 1992).
The Smith rationale is applicable under article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The
language of article I, section 12 is similar to that of the Tennessee Constitution, and calls for
broader protection than the federal counterpart. This argument is explored more thoroughly in
Subsection B: Mr. Alfred's Conviction Should be Reversed Without Reference to the Harm that
Resonated from his Probative and Damaging Confession.
20

Id. In affirming the trial court's suppression of the pre-Miranda statements but not the
post-Miranda confession, this Court held that, without evidence of coercion, a postMiranda confession is not presumed to be involuntary. Id. at 1016-17. Quoting Oregon v.
Elstad, this Court noted that:
[i]mportantly, defendant's characterization of the interrogation setting as
inherently coercive is based on speculation alone, not evidence presented to
the trial court. This characterization conflicts with our responsibility to
assess the voluntariness of the confession by analyzing the characteristics
of the accused and the details of the interrogation.
Id at 1016 (citing State v. Miller. 829 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). Because the
defense presented no evidence of coercion other than the age and race of the defendant
compared with that of the detectives, this Court had no basis for finding that the postMiranda confession was involuntary.
Recent cases have combined Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
protections to apply a two-part test in evaluating defendants' confessions. First, a
reviewing court must find that the defendant understood his rights. Second, the court
must find that the confession was voluntary under the "totality of circumstances" test.
David M. Nissman & Ed Hagen, Law of Confessions § 6:6 (2nd ed. 1994).
Prosecutors have often met the first requirement of showing "[intelligent waiver"
of Miranda rights by presenting evidence that "the defendant received warnings, was
asked if he or she understood them, and gave an affirmative response." David M.
Nissman & Ed Hagen, Law of Confessions § 6:7 (2nd ed. 1994). However, some courts
have held that, even if this colloquy occurs, evidence of mental deficiencies provides a
21

basis for suppressing a confession. United States v. Robles-Ramirez. 93 F.Supp. 2d 762,
767 (W.D. Tex. 2000); People v. Bernasco. 562 N.E.2d 958, 963-64 (111. 1990); People v.
Garwood. 517 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Mich. App. 1994). This does not mean that confessing
to a crime must be a logical or intelligent course of action,20 but it emphasizes that the
Miranda exclusionary rule is meant to ensure that confessions are consciously and
knowingly made.21
With regard to the second requirement of voluntariness, one of the most important
developments was the United States Supreme Court holding of Colorado v. Connelly,
which indicated that police coercion is a "necessary predicate" to a finding of
involuntariness. Connelly. 479 U.S. at 167. However, the subjective characteristics of the
defendant also play a vital role in examinations of the admissibility of confessions.
Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court recently held in State v. Rettenberger that an 18year-old confessor with the maturity level of a 15-year-old, a below-average I.Q., and
attention-deficit disorder, as well as symptoms of depression, anxiety disorder, thought
disorder, schizophrenia, and dependent personality disorder did not voluntarily make his
confession.22 Accordingly, this Court has also regarded the mental capacities of
20

Connecticut v. Barrett. 479 U.S. 523 (1987).

21

See Bybee, 2000 UT 43, ^[21 (examining defendant's intelligence in determining
whether a Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary); State v. Miller, 829 P.2d 132, 134 Utah
Ct. App. 1992) (noting that defendant was "an intelligent individual with some college
education" in ruling that a confession was knowing and voluntary).
22

Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f37-45. The Court's holding was not based solely upon the
subjective characteristics of the defendant. The Court also examined the objective factors of the
interrogation, including police misrepresentations to the defendant, use of the "false friend
22

defendants as significant in determining the voluntariness of confessions.23 The
defendant's subjective characteristics play a role even where the interrogators are not
aware of all of the defendant's deficiencies. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f38. These
characteristics, along with the details of the interrogation, are the two principal factors in
determining the voluntariness of a confession. Id at ^ 14-15.

A. Mr, Alfred's Post-Miranda Confession, Given Under the Threat of an
Encounter with a Vicious Dog, Does Not Meet the Tests of Intelligence
and Voluntariness Required under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
The facts of this case indicate that Mr. Alfred's post-Miranda confession was
neither an intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights, nor was it voluntary under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The possibility of an encounter with a police-trained German
Shepherd of testy temperament is coercive, particularly in this context, where the threat
was spawned by the failure of anyone to confess to ownership of the black bag. Further,
when Mr. Allred gave his post-Miranda confession, the coercive effect of the officers'
threat to bring a fierce dog to the scene had not dissipated. It had been enhanced. The
arrival of the police dog and its handler solidified the initial threat, and the dog's release
from the car provided further intimidation. The police did not recall their threat, and only

technique" wherein the interrogator poses as a "friend" of the defendant's who is acting in his
best interest, and use of threats and promises during interrogation. Id. at ^[20-32.
23

Miller, 829 P.2d at 134 (finding voluntariness where the defendant was "an intelligent
individual with some college education," "'a mind that can make sudden and important
distinctions in language,'" and "very familiar with the legal system. He has been to prison twice,
jailed four times, and has had some fifteen encounters with police.")
23

minutes had passed since the officers had discussed bringing a fierce dog. Mr. Allred, as
he sat handcuffed at the picnic table with three police officers around him, saw a palpable
threat of physical harm and lacked support from his former companions. He was also
faced with the possibility of direct confrontation with the police dog if he recanted the
confession he had made minutes earlier. This is a classic example of a defendant who
confesses only because of the taint of an earlier confession.
Coerciveness during the initial confession is indicated by the fact that it was not
until after the threat was made that Mr. Allred claimed ownership of the bag. R. 190
[180]. Mr. Allred had previously indicated at least three different times that the bag was
not his, R. 190 [145-47], and claimed ownership only after the officers threatened to
bring a fierce dog to the scene. R. 190 [179-80]. This strongly supports that both of Mr.
Allred's confessions were coerced.
Further, Mr. Allred's post-Miranda confession was not attenuated by either time or
distance from his initial statement. The post-Miranda confession took place at the same
picnic table where Mr. Allred was sitting when he initially claimed ownership of the bag,
R. 190 [169], and it was heard by one of the same officers who had threatened to bring a
fierce dog to the scene. R. 190 [168-69]. In essence, the "coercive effect of the [first]
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R. 190 [166-68]. The temporal proximity of a coerced and post-Miranda confession is a
factor considered in determining whether the second confession was tainted. Allen. 839 P.2d at
300-01.
24

confession" had not dissipated.
The case is distinguishable from State v. James. 858 P.2d at 1013-14. In James,
the defendant was arrested and, prior to being read his Miranda rights, was asked general
questions about his name, birth date, birth place, living arrangements, and employment.
Id at 1013. He then confessed. Id. at 1014. The defendant did not allege, nor did the facts
reveal, that the initial confession was coerced. Id Without this taint, the post-Miranda
confession, also voluntarily given, was properly admitted into evidence. Id. at 1018.
In this case, however, the police admit to bandying talk of bringing a fierce dog,
who had previously bitten a suspect, to the scene. R. 190 [178-80]. Mr. Allred confessed
to owning the bag to avoid confrontation with the dog, and he was still reacting to this
threat when he gave his post-Miranda confession. He was still at the same table, still with
the officers who had threatened to bring the dog, and was actually faced with the prospect
of encountering the dog. Thus, the post-Miranda confession is not distinguishable from
the initial, coerced confession with regard to the surrounding circumstances.
Finally, the trial court itself expressed grave concern about the officers' handling
of this case. Although ultimately ruling that the post-Miranda confession was admissible,
the court stated:
I don't like the way this is handled, and you know, I've spent time in
Liberty Park myself. I roller blade there. I bike there. I take my daughter
there. We picnic there, and if officers had come up to me and had started
asking me questions and threatening] me with a dog and gone through my
25

See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311-12 (noting that when police force a full confession, the
coercive effect of that confession may, with sufficient time, dissipate).
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personal effects, even though they would not have found drugs, it's kind of
a terrifying thing to contemplate and I'm not so sure that the manner in
which this is handled is guaranteed to get to the truth in a fair and
appropriate manner. I'm going to think about it.
R. 188 [38-39]. The trial court's ultimate ruling that Mr. Allred's pre-Miranda confession
was not coerced, and that the post-Miranda confession is admissible, is contrary to the
court's initial misgivings and the evidence on record.26 The record supports that both
confessions should have been suppressed, and admission of the second confession was
error.

B. Mr, Allred's Conviction Should be Reversed Without Reference to the
Harm that Resonated from his Probative and Damaging Confession
The pages of law on the issue of whether a harmless error analysis applies to
coerced confessions under the Utah Constitution have yet to be written. As with other
provisions of our state constitution, the coercion provision of Article I, section 12 is
vastly unexplored and is brimming with opportunities to apply enlightened wisdom to
revered passages.27 This case, in particular, presents this Court with a well-timed
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314. Additionally, the trial court apparently had some question
regarding Mr. Allred's mental capacity, which plays a role in determining whether a defendant
intelligently waived his rights and whether the waiver was voluntary. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,
f 14-15. After trial, the trial court ordered a diagnostic evaluation of Mr. Allred. R. 152-54. The
report indicated that he has an I.Q. of 83, performs at a fourth-grade level in reading and a sixthgrade level in spelling and arithmetic, has a history of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder,
and has Antisocial Personality Disorder. R. 158 [Diagnostic Evaluation 3, 6]. While these
characteristics were not considered by the trial court, such information is part of the "totality of
circumstances" and should be considered. Rettenbergen 1999 UT 80, ]f 15.
27

See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (Encouraging attorneys
to "heed the call of the appellate courts of this State to more fully brief [Utah courts] on relevant
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opportunity to firmly curtail dangerous police excesses and to avoid the practical errors
of the heavily-criticized United States Supreme Court opinion of Arizona v. Fulmininate.
Article I, section 12 establishes that "[t]he accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself

"Utah Const, art. I, § 12. At the time this provision was

adopted by the newly-formed State of Utah it was well-established that the admission of
coerced confessions was reversible error as a matter of law.28 In fact, no constitutional
errors were subject to the harmlessness analysis, and the harmless error doctrine itself
was part of a reform movement barely in its infancy.29 Over the next half-century, the
states adopted harmlessness rules that served to block criminal conviction reversals for
"small errors or defects" that have negligible effects on the trials.30
state constitutional questions.")
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Payne, 356 U.S. at 567-68 ("Respondent suggests that, apart from the confession, there
was adequate evidence before the jury to sustain the verdict. But where, as here, a coerced
confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is returned, no
one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession. And in these circumstances
this Court has uniformly held that even though there may have been sufficient evidence, apart
from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction, the admission in evidence,
over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.")
29

Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error
to Coerced Confessions, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 152, 156-57 (1991). See also Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 48-49 (1967) (Harlan, J. dissenting) ("Previously most American appellate courts,
concerned about the harshness of criminal penalties, followed the rule imposed on English courts
through the efforts of Baron Parke, and held that any error of substance required a reversal of
conviction. See Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 190. The reform movement, led by
authorities like Roscoe Pound and Learned Hand, resulted in allowing courts to discontinue
using reversal as a 'necessary' remedy for particular errors and 'to substitute judgment for the
automatic application of rules
' 4 Barron, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571, at 438.")
30

Chapman. 386 U.S. at 22. In 1907 Utah adopted a statute which provided: "'After
hearing an appeal, the court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects or
27

It was not until the case of Chapman v. California in 1967 that the United States
Supreme Court departed from centuries of practice to apply a harmlessness analysis to a
constitutional error. Chapman. 386 U.S. at 23-24. Application of the analysis was
tempered, however, by the Court's recognition that the analysis "can work very unfair
and mischievous results when, for example, highly important and persuasive evidence, or
argument, though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of
guilt or innocence is a close one." Id. at 22-23. Accordingly, some constitutional
protections, including the protection from coerced confessions, were deemed "so basic to
a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error

"31

The Chapman Court's regard for coerced confession errors was warranted and
appropriate. Confessions extracted by means of torture or coercion in the English system
were abhorred in this country and served as an impetus of the Fifth Amendment.32 The
damning and pervasive consequences of confessions in the minds of jurors, and upon the
proceeding of the trial itself, were commonly recognized and the improper extraction of

exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties/" State v. Cluff, 158 P. 701,
703 (Utah 1916) (quoting the statute). This was the predecessor of Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure currently in force. Rule 30 reads, "(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Utah Crim.
P. 30(a) (2001).
31

Id at 23. The Court also indicated that the failure to provide counsel or an impartial
judge were errors that could never be treated as harmless. Id. Since Chapman, it has been further
recognized that the dismissal of venirepersons solely on the basis of race or sex may never be
treated as harmless. Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S.
127,130-31(1994).
32

See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442-43 (Chronicling the evils of the English system and their
effects on the American colonists).
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confessions was condemned. Payne, 356 U.S. at 566-68.
Nearly a quarter of a century after Chapman, however, the harmlessness analysis
encroached upon coerced confessions when a heavily divided United States Supreme
Court applied an analysis to a coerced confession in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at
310-12. A strong dissent of four Justices decried the majority's application of the
analysis, asserting:
A defendant's confession is "probably the most probative and damaging
evidence that can be admitted against him," . . . so damaging that a jury
should not be expected to ignore it even if told to do s o , . . . and because in
any event it is impossible to know what credit and weight the jury gave to
the confession.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted). The dissent also observed that the
prohibition against coerced confessions:
reflects the "strong felt attitude of our society that important human values
are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing
a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will," . . . as
well as "the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while
enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves" . . . . Thus, permitting a
coerced confession to be part of the evidence on which a jury is free to base
its verdict of guilty is inconsistent with the thesis that ours is not an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice.
Id. at 293-94. These criticisms, and others, were later voiced in harsh criticisms of
Fulminante.33
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David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000 Utah L.
Rev. 483; Charles S. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error. 51 Okla. L. Rev. 501 (1998); David
McCord, The "Triar/"Structurar Error Dichotomy: Erroneous and Not Harmless, 45 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 1401 (1997); Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human. But Not Always Harmless: When
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Historically, the Utah Supreme Court noted with approval the automatic reversal
of convictions tainted by coerced confession evidence.34 In fact, there is nothing in the
case law to indicate that the appellate courts of this State approved of anything other than
automatic reversal for coerced confessions prior to Fulminante. After Fulminante. this
Court applied a harmlessness analysis to a confession that was allegedly coerced in
violation of the federal constitution. State v. James, 858 P.2d at 1018. However, this
Court has not addressed the application of harmlessness under the Utah Constitution.35
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the applicability of harmlessness
under the coercion provision of article I, section 12.36 In light of the context in which
article I, section 12 was created, the plain language of the coercion provision, and the
common law origin of the phrase, the Utah Constitution should be construed to mandate
reversal of all convictions tainted by unconstitutionally coerced confessions.
It is well established that state constitutional provisions may provide broader

Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 NYU L. Rev. 1167 (1995); Craig Goldblatt, Harmless
Error as Constitutional Common Law: Congress' Power to Reverse Arizona v. Fulminante. 60
U.Chi. L. Rev. 985 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of
Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions. 105 Harv. L. Rev. 152 (1991).
34

In State v. Crank the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval Bram v. United States.
168 U.S. 532, 540-42 (1897), which held that admission of a coerced confession was per se
reversible error. State v. Crank. 142 P.2d 178, 188-92 (Utah 1943).
35

State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

36

The Court was presented with the issue in State v. Guiterrez. 864 P.2d 894, 898 n.4
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), but it did not address that issue because the State conceded error. Then, in
Rettenberger. 1999 UT 80, ^45, the Court found that police had coerced a confession from the
defendant, but the Court did not address the issue of harm because that case involved an
interlocutory appeal.
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protections than their federal counterparts. The federal constitution, and the law
interpreting it, is merely a floor below which the states may not descend in prosecuting
citizens and enforcing the law. Further, an independent state constitutional analysis
should be conducted whenever an unsettled state constitutional question arises, regardless
of whether there is an established federal interpretation on point. As Justice Daniel
Stewart has noted:
Because the framers of the Utah Constitution modified certain provisions in
the Bill of Rights before they were placed in the Utah Constitution, and
even added certain provisions not found in the federal constitution, this
Court should not be bound to construe Utah constitutional provisions in
light of federal law, except in "the most compelling circumstances."
Indeed, this Court has, on a number of occasions, construed state
constitutional provisions differently than the United States Supreme Court
has construed similar federal provisions.
State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1240 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
In interpreting a constitutional provision, the provision should be construed
according to its plain language. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997).
Further, "[i]t is a cardinal rule of construction that constitutions should be construed in
light of their framers' intent." American Fork City v. Crosgrove. 701 P.2d 1069, 1072
(Utah 1985).
The plain language of article I, section 12 indicates that "[t]he accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself...." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. This language
differs from its federal counterpart, which indicates that"... nor shall any person . . . be
37

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. See Gibbons v. Qgden, 22 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1824) (recognizing
the supremacy of federal law enacted pursuant to the federal constitution).
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compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. .." U.S. Const, amend.
V. The Utah language is broader on its face. The term "evidence," used in the Utah
provision, means "[s]omething (including testimony, documents and tangible objects)
that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged f a c t . . . . " Black's Law
Dictionary 576 (7th ed. 1999). On the other hand, the term "witness," used in the federal
provision, is more specifically defined as "[o]ne who sees, knows, or vouches for
something . . . [o]ne who gives testimony, under oath or affirmation (1) in person, (2) by
oral or written deposition, or (3) by affidavit... ."38
Not only did the Utah constitutional framers deliberately choose broader language

Id. at 1596. This difference in language has been the basis for broad interpretation of
the coercion provision. In 1980 the Utah Supreme Court held that a court order directing a
forgery defendant to provide the State with a handwriting sample violated article I, section 12 of
the Utah Constitution. Hansen v. Owens. 619 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1980). The Court noted the
provision's use of the term "evidence" as opposed to "witness," and held:
In legal formulations, it is to be assumed that the words used were chosen
advisedly. This is particularly true in such foundational documents as
constitutions, which it can be assumed are framed with greater than usual care and
deliberation. Consequently, when terms of clearly different meanings are used
within the same framework, each should be given its own separate, commonly
understood meaning. Judged in that light, it seems reasonable to assume that the
phrase "to give evidence against himself," as used in our constitution, was
intended to mean something different and broader than the phrase "to be a witness
against himself as used in the federal constitution. Such a distinction has
heretofore been recognized by this Court.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Later, the Court held that this difference in language did not prohibit the
State from requiring a defendant to submit to a breathalyzer test. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d at 1075.
However, in that case the Court emphasized that, even its holding tempered that of Hansen, "the
right of the individual not to reveal his thoughts in the face of accusations by the state - the most
fundamental right sought to be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination - remains
inviolate." In this case, that is precisely the privilege at issue.
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than that adopted more than one hundred years previously in the federal constitution,
they did so in the context of the legal principles in force at that time. At that time,
constitutional errors were reversible per se. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v.
Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 Harv.
L. Rev. 152, 156-57 (1991). This principle was soundly steeped in the English common
law and the framers could not have foreseen that, nearly a century later, coerced
confessions would become subject to a new test, known as the harmlessness analysis, on
the federal level. Fulminante. 499 U.S. at 310-12.
The language of the Utah provision is remarkably similar to that of the Tennessee
Constitution. The Tennessee provision reads, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ..
. shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." Tenn. Const, art. I, § 9.
Recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court has emphasized that "the test of voluntariness for
confessions under Article I, [section] 9 is broader and more protective of individual rights
than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment...." State v. Walton, 41

The reason for the adoption of broader language is likely attributable, at least in part, to
the experiences of the Mormon pioneers who settled in this State. The Mormons had experienced
religious persecution which led to their immigration to this area, and had endured legal injustices
in the East. Michael S. Durham, Desert Between the Mountains 115-25 (1997); Thomas G.
Alexander, Utah: The Right Place 99 (1996). Further, after their settlement in Utah, many
Mormons were held in contempt of court or otherwise prosecuted because they refused to
provide information to federal prosecutors in polygamy investigations. Edward Leo Lyman,
Political Deliverance: The Mormon Quest for Utah Statehood 25-35 (1986). In particular,
pregnant, polygamist wives were imprisoned for refusing to incriminate themselves or their
husbands. Id. 206-08. Although other factors, such as the influx of foreign immigrants working
in the mines or on the railroads, Michael S. Durham, Desert Between the Mountains 115-25
(1997), may have influenced language in the Utah constitution, Mormon pioneer experiences
were likely prominent factors.
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S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tenn. 2001). Accordingly, in Tennessee, a harmlessness analysis is
inappropriate and is not applied where a confession is coerced in violation of the
Tennessee Constitution.40
Likewise, the Texas Court of Appeals recently asserted that confessions coerced in
violation of the Texas due process clause are not subject to a harmlessness analysis.
Zuliani v. State. 903 S.W.2d 812, 825 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). That Court, after
unenthusiastically accepting the holding of Fulminante as it applies to the federal
constitution, declared "a state appellate court may construe its comparable state
constitutional provision more broadly than the United States Supreme Court does the
federal constitutional provision." Id The court continued, "[f]inding no authority to show
that the admission of a coerced confession obtained by physical violence and threats in
violation of article I, section 19 of our state constitution or our statutory provisions is
subject to a harm analysis, we decline to apply such analysis." Id.
Other state appellate courts recognize, in the wake of Fulminante, that their states'
constitutional provisions regarding coerced confessions provide broader protection than
the federal constitution.41 These states decide such issues solely on the basis of state

40

Id at 94. See also State v. Crump. 834 S.W.2d 265, 271-72 (Tenn. 1992) (without
applying harmless error analysis, Tennessee Supreme Court reverses conviction based on
confession coerced in violation of the state constitution).
41

State v. Bowe. 881 P.2d 538, 546 (Ha. 1994); People v. Bender. 551 N.W. 2d 71, 80
(Mich. 1996); State v. Monroe. 711 A.2d 878, 883 (N.H. 1998).
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constitutional law, referring to federal law only as an aid to analysis. * Their holdings
apply to issues ranging from the involvement of private parties in a confession,43 to police
officers' failure to disclose counsel-related issues to a defendant,44 and they provide
greater protection than the holdings of federal cases.
The Utah provision warrants the application of broader protections for Utah
citizens who are unconstitutionally coerced into confessing. The language of the Utah
provision is broader than the federal counterpart, and the history of the people of Utah
and their experiences provide a justifiable basis for the provision. Additionally, the legal
context of the provision's adoption indicates that the framers did not intend a harmless
error analysis to apply to coerced confessions. The well-reasoned opinions from
Tennessee and Texas, which refrain from applying a harmless error analysis to coerced
confessions, should be followed in this state. While arriving at factual accuracy in cases
is a principal goal of our judicial system, "[a]t some point, certain serious constitutional
errors may violate the rights of the accused to such an extent that, independent of the
accused's guilt or innocence, we as a society must simply draw a line and declare that a
conviction based in any way on such an error must be reversed." Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,

See Monroe, 711 A.2d at 883 ("Because the State Constitution provides greater
protection to a criminal defendant with respect to confessions than does the Federal Constitution,
we decide this case under the State Constitution with reference to federal cases only to aid our
analysis.")
43

Bowe,881P.2dat546.

44

Bender. 551 N.W.2d at 80-81.
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Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions.
105 Harv. L. Rev. 152, 168-69 (1991). Under the Utah Constitution, that line should be
drawn at coerced confessions.
Finally, if the admission of coerced confessions is brushed aside on the basis of
the harmlessness rationale, the police will continue using unconstitutional means to wring
confessions from defendants. Part of the purpose of the coercion provision is to curb
grievous police behavior which, in the end, damages society more than the criminals
themselves. Fulminante. 499 U.S. at 193 (J. White, dissenting). As the Tennessee
Supreme Court observed, coercive police tactics are unlikely in Tennessee because:
if the statements leading to the discovery of the physical evidence are
actually coerced in any way, either physically or psychologically, then all
of the statements and physical evidence discovered therefrom will be
excluded, and the state may be without any evidence to prosecute the
crime.
Walton. 41 S.W.3d at 94. This acts as a powerful deterrent to police that preserves a safe
and lawful society. Given the similar interest of the Utah constitutional framers in
protecting society, a harmlessness analysis is inappropriate under the coercion provision.
Even if a showing of harmfulness was required, Mr. Allred's conviction should be
reversed. A reviewing court should exercise extreme caution in determining that an
admission was harmless. Fulminante. 499 U.S. at 296. Here, the trial court's error in
failing to suppress evidence of Mr. Allred's post-Miranda confession was harmful
because there is no evidence, beyond his confession, to support the charge of Possession
of a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute. R. 190 [168]. Absent Mr. Allred's
36

confession, the only supporting evidence is circumstantial evidence that he was part of a
group of six people sitting at the picnic table where the bag was discovered. R. 190 [128].
Even this evidence is dubious because the bag was not laying near him, R. 190 [131], he
was not observed holding or touching the bag, and nothing in the bag indicated that he
was the owner. R. 190 [145-46]. Thus, Mr. Alfred's confession was vital to State's case
with regard to the elements of possession and intent.45

II

EVIDENCE THAT STEREOS AND TOOLS WERE IN THE BLACK BAG.
AND TESTIMONY THAT MR. ALLRED HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY
MIRANDIZED. WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL BECAUSE IT
ENCOURAGED THE JURY TO PUNISH MR. ALLRED REGARDLESS
OF HIS CULPABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION
The trial court failed to recognize that the cumulative effect of testimony about the

stereos and tools in the black bag, and about Mr. Allred's previous Miranda experience,
irreparably prejudiced this case. Before trial, the defense counsel attempted to avoid such
errors by obtaining a pre-trial stipulation that evidence regarding the stereos would not be
presented. In light of the composition of the jury, which included at least three burglary
victims, such errors could not be adequately remedied by a curative instruction. After the
stipulation was violated, along with Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) which bars evidence
of prior bad acts, the trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. Allred's motion for a mistrial.
A reviewing court should reverse a defendant's conviction if the trial court's
45

See R. 125 (outlining the elements of the offense). See also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(1) (a) (iii) (2000) ( "... it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: .. . (iii)
possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute ....")
37

denial of his motion for a mistrial was: 1) plainly wrong, and, 2) the incident at issue so
likely influenced the jury as to rob the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Vargas, 2001 UT
5, 1 44, 20 P.3d 271; State v. Widdison. 2000 UT App 185, 1 57,4 P.3d 100. In this case,
the harmful admission of evidence in violation of counsels' pre-trial stipulation, and
Rules 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, justifies a reversal.
Under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
Utah R.Evid. 404(b) (2001). Case law has indicated that, under Rule 404(b), a "trial court
must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and
(3) whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Webster, 2000 UT
App 238,131, 32 P.3d 976 (quoting State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57,120, 993 P.2d 837).
Under the first part of the analysis, a reviewing court examines the purpose of the
evidence to determine whether it was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose such as
one of those specifically listed in Rule 404(b). Webster. 2000 UT App 238,131. If the
purpose was improper, its inclusion was error. One improper purpose is "to disgrace the
defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and thus likely
to have committed the crime charged." State v. Daniels. 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978).
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Under the second part of the analysis, a reviewing court must determine whether
the evidence was relevant under Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. State v. Reed,
2000 UT 68, Tf 27, 8 P.3d 1025. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R.Evid. 401
(2001).
Under the final part of the analysis, a reviewing court must determine whether the
evidence meets the requirements of Rule 403. Reed. 2000 UT 68,f23. Rule 403 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence indicates that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R.Evid. 403 (2001). In determining whether the probative value of evidence is
outweighed by considerations of fairness:
a variety of matters must be considered, including the strength of the
evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between
the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to
which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
Salt Lake City v. Alires. 2000 UT App 244, % 16, 9 P.3d 769 (quoting State v. Shickles.
760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988)). See also State v. Ramirez. 924 P.2d 366, 369-70
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). Specifically, the Rule "presumes the admission of all relevant
evidence except where the evidence has 'an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice,
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inflame, or mislead' the jury." State v. Lindgren. 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App.
1996)(citations omitted). Such evidence includes evidence which "'appeals to the jury's
sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes the instinct to punish,' or otherwise 'may
cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of
the case.'" Id (quoting Carter v. Hewitt 617 F.2d 961, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1980)). See also
State v. Maurer. 770 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1989).
In this case, the admission of the police officers' testimonies about the stereos and
tools in the bag, as well as Mr. Allred's prior Miranda experience, was not proper under
any part of the analysis. The State effectively conceded prior to trial by stipulating to the
exclusion of the stereo evidence. R. 190 [15]. The following agreement was made:
MS. REMAL [defense counsel]:... As the Court is I'm sure aware from
our Motion hearing, the bag in question contained what appears to be
marijuana and ultimately was tested to be, as well as some other property
which included car stereos and face plates from stereos. It's my
understanding that Ms. Wissler has instructed her witnesses THE COURT: Not to allude MS. REMAL: - not to mention specifically what they are. I think what
she's planning to do was simply ask them did Mr. Allred explain the other
property or, but not go into what the property is or not go into what
specifically what Mr. Allred said about the other property.
THE COURT: Certainly seems like an appropriate way to handle it. Is that
your intention Ms. Allred [sic].
MS WISSLER [prosecutor]: It is.
R. 190 [14-15]. Later, after the defense counsel motioned for a mistrial, the trial court
misstated the stipulation and denied the motion. R. 190 [230]. The court erroneously
40

described the stipulation as follows:
THE COURT: That was my understanding that there would be no lengthy
discussion of the stereos, that what would occur would be a brief
description of what was seen in the black bag, that there would be
absolutely no inference or follow-up on the potential source of the stereos.
R. 190 [230-31]. Because the record shows that the original stipulation contemplated no
mention of the stereos, the court's denial of the motion for a mistrial was error.
Even though an analysis of the improper testimonies is not necessary under the
three-part test of Rule 404(b) because of the pre-trial stipulation by counsel, an analysis
highlights that the admission of testimonies about the stereos and tools, as well as Mr.
Alfred's prior Miranda experience, is wrong.
Under the first part of the analysis, the testimonies were not offered for a "proper,
noncharacter purpose," Webster, 2000 UT App 238, |31, such as "proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (2001). Evidence that stereos and tools were found in the
black bag with the marijuana did not support any element of the crime of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute.46 Likewise, the fact that Mr. Allred had
been read his Miranda rights on a previous occasion does not bear on the determination
of whether he committed the crime charged. The only purpose of the stereo and Miranda
evidence was to disgrace Mr. Allred as "a person of evil character with a propensity to

46

See R. 125 (outlining the elements of the offense). See also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(1) (a) (iii) (2000) ( "... it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: ... (iii)
possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute ....")
41

commit crime and thus likely to have committed the crime charged." Daniels, 584 P.2d at
882. Therefore, this evidence should not have been included at trial.
Additionally, this evidence is not relevant under Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. The fact that there were stereos and tools in the black bag and that Mr. Allred
had been read his Miranda rights on a prior occasion is not material to any of the
elements of the crime charged. These facts are not material to show that, on the day that
Mr. Allred was arrested, he was in possession of marijuana. They do not show that Mr.
Allred intended to distribute the marijuana. Nor do they show Mr. Allred's mental state.
See R. 125 (stating the elements of the offense). They are supportive of nothing other
than Mr. Allred's propensity to commit crime, and this is prohibited under Rules 404(b)
and 402. Decorso, 1999 UT 47, If 22.
Evidence of the stereos and tools, and Mr. Allred's prior Miranda experience, fails
the third part of the analysis because it is highly likely to unfairly prejudice the jury. Two
different times the prosecutor elicited and obtained information from police officers
regarding the stereos and tools that were found in the bag, R. 190 [133, 165], and this
strongly suggested that Mr. Allred was involved in burglary, theft, or other wrongful
appropriation. This is exactly the type of information which "'provokes the instinct to
punish,' or otherwise 'may cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the
established propositions of the case.'" Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1272 (citation omitted).
Later, Officer Evan's testimony that Mr. Allred had been Mirandized previously, R. 190
[167], enhanced this effect and all three pieces of evidence, taken together, heavily
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prejudiced Mr. Alfred's case.
The composition of the jury increases the likelihood that these improper
admissions prejudiced the jury. At least three members of the jury had been victims of
home burglaries,47 and one juror indicated that her son's car had been broken into the day
before voir dire. R. 190 [66]. Information about the car stereos and tools, along with Mr.
Alfred's prior Miranda experience, likely influenced these jurors' view of the drug
charges. The trial court did not consider the possible prejudicial impact of the officers'
improper testimonies on the jury, R. 190 [224-235], and this was error in light of
counsels' pre-trial stipulation and the analysis under Rule 404(b).
A curative instruction was inadequate to remedy the prejudicial impact of
evidence that stereos and tools were in the bag, and the defense counsel declined to draw
further attention to this evidence through a curative instruction. However, the trial court
attempted to remedy the introduction of Mr. Alfred's prior Miranda experience by
suggesting to the jury that one of the police officers in this case was simply ascertaining
whether the other officer had already read Mr. Alfred his Miranda rights when he was
arrested. R. 190 [238]. This did not mitigate the overall prejudicial affect. The court did

Renee Beck indicated that her home had been burglarized 15 or 20 years previously, R.
190 [64], and Kim Duncan indicated that her home had been burglarized about 20 years
previously. R. 190 [66]. Another member of the venire indicated that his or her home was
robbed, "and it was also drug related." R. 190 [69]. This venireperson was not identified and it is
uncertain whether he or she served on the jury. Id. However, it should be assumed that this
venireperson served because the defendant must be given "the best that he would have been able
to prove if he had a complete transcript of voir dire . . . . " State v. Russell 917 P.2d 557, 560
(Utah Ct.App. 1996).
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not instruct the jury to ignore evidence of Miranda warnings. R. 190 [238-39]. At any
rate, the jury's awareness of the stereos and tools could not be adequately remedied.
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that, even though curative
instructions "are a settled and necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the
most important tools by which a court may remedy errors at trial," State v. Harmon. 956
P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998), curative instructions are not a "cure-all." Id at 273. "Some
errors may be too prejudicial for curative instructions to mitigate their effect, and a new
trial may be the only proper remedy." IdL The Court quoted the United States Supreme
Court in concluding:
"[W]e normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an
'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the
court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence
would be 'devastating' to the defendant."
Id (quoting Greer v. Miller. 483 U.S. 756, 767 n. 8 (1987)).
In this case, a new trial is the only fair remedy. The State's case depended
primarily upon Mr. Allred's post-Miranda confession, and improper testimony about the
stereos and Mr. Allred's prior Miranda experience unfairly enhanced the fact-finder's
predisposition48 to accept Mr. Allred's confession as voluntary. The improper evidence
strongly indicated that Mr. Allred was a career thief and drug dealer, and crippled the

48

In evaluating whether to give a confession weight, a fact finder is often predisposed to
accept the confession because "the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily
and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence . . . ." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
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jury's ability to objectively evaluate Mr. Allred's confession. It also encouraged the jury
to punish Mr. Allred even if he did not commit the crime charged. Thus, Mr. Allred's
should receive a new trial that is untainted by prejudicial evidence.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EXCITED UTTERANCE
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MAN NAMED CLAY ARRIVED AFTER
MR. ALLRED HAD BEEN ARRESTED. CLAIMED OWNERSHIP OF THE
BAG. AND EXPRESSED ANGER THAT THE BAG WAS MISSING
Evidence of Clay's admission is reliable because he made the admission while
under the stress of excitement caused by the discovery that his bag of contraband was
missing. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 803(2) "[a] statement relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition" is admissible. Utah R.Evid. 803(2) (2001). Case law has established
that three conditions must be met before evidence may be admitted under Rule 803(2).
First, a startling event or condition must occur. West Valley City v. Hutto. 2000 UT App
188, f 15, 5 P.3d 1. Second, the declarant must make the statement while under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition. Id. Third, the statement must relate to the
startling event or condition. Id.
The most difficult issue in determining whether evidence is admissible is often
"whether the statement was uttered with a spontaneity produced by emotional excitement
to a degree that provides a warrant of trustworthiness." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 240
(Utah 1995). This "requires the evaluation of a variety of factors, including the nature of
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the startling event and the intensity of the excitement or other emotional effect on the
declarant." Id Temporal proximity between the startling event and the utterance is
another relevant factor. Id Ultimately,
the determinative factor, subject to no precise or absolute standard, is
whether the state of the declarant's mind was such that because of a high
degree of emotional arousal, the declaration was spontaneous in the sense
that the declarant's emotional arousal or excitement at the time of the
statement strongly suggested that the statement came purely from the
declarant's memory, unchanged or distorted by a consideration of the
consequences of the statement.
Id. In other words, "'[t]he crucial question . . . is whether the declarant was still under the
influence of the event to the extent that his statement could not be the result of
fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.'" Id. (quoting
State v. Thomas. 777 P.2d 445, 449 (Utah 1989)).
The issue of whether a declarant is available to testify is immaterial. This is
established in the heading of Rule 803. Utah R.Evid. R. 803 (2001). Furthermore, this
Court49 and the United States Supreme Court50 have held that the federal and state
Confrontation Clauses do not require a showing that a declarant is unavailable before
excited utterance testimony may be included. Ultimately, it is not essential to even know
a declarant's identity in admitting his excited utterance. Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N.
Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 8-47 (1996).
In this case, the heart of the trial judge's ruling was her determination that the
49

Salt Lake City v. Alires. 2000 UT App 244,120, 9 P.3d 769.

50

White v. Illinois. 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992).
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evidence of Clay's admission was not "inherently reliable." R. 191 [302]. The court was
also disturbed by the fact that Clay's admission was not made known to the State until
trial. R. 191 [291-92]. Decrying the use of "Perry Mason" surprises in the court, and
referring to the evidence as "newly discovered crap," R. 191 [290], the trial court stated:
If we had a last name, if we knew that this was a real person. If, for
example, this were a friend of the defendant, who had left the jurisdiction
and couldn't be found, I'd be more inclined to let it in because we have
inherent reliability, or at least arguably that would be present in the
friendship between the two. And the fact that we have a full name and it's
not just somebody pulled out of the air. But we have nothing. We don't
know if this person existed; who they were, where they got their
information, and the very important rights to confront and cross examine,
which are not limited to the defendant. But the State has a right to see
witnesses that are giv[ing] testimony. That's the reason why hearsay is
precluded.
R. 191 [303]. The court also stated that "if this information had been provided to the
State timely, I might be willing to bend over backwards to assist the defense in using
this."R. 191 [304].
Reliability of evidence is always an important issue. However, "reliability may be
inferred without any further showing if the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception," such as the excited utterance exception.51 Once the evidence is shown to fit
within the exception, the unavailability of the declarant to testify is immaterial, Utah

51

Cole v. Tansv. 926 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980)). See also Martinez v. Sullivan. 881 F.2d 921, 928 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he 'excited
utterance' exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence so that
reliability may be inferred
"); Hutto, 2000 UT App 188, ^ 11 ("Sometimes, however,
hearsay statements are made under circumstances which offer substantial guaranties of
trustworthiness, minimizing the likelihood of falsification.... 'Excited utterances' are one such
exception.")(citations omitted).
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R.Evid. 803 (2001), and no showing of unavailability52 or personal knowledge of the
declarant53 is necessary. Further, Clay's admission was discovered by a defense
investigator while interviewing a witness whose name and address had been provided by
the State at the preliminary hearing. R. 191 [292]. The State had access to this
information and an opportunity to challenge the reliability of the information. The State
also had an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Ortiz at trial. The trial court's ruling is,
therefore, fundamentally unsound because it is based upon factors that do not play a role
in evaluating the admissibility of excited utterance evidence.
The proffered evidence falls within the excited utterance exception. The startling
event which prompted Clay's statements was his discovery that his bag of contraband
was missing. Objectively, such a discovery is likely to place the bag's owner under the
"stress of excitement," Utah R.Evid. 803(2) (2001) because of the loss of drugs for his
buyers and himself, and the loss of potential income from the drugs and stereos. The real
question, however, involves the subjective effect of the discovery upon Clay. If the event
did, in fact, lead to adequate excitement, then the event is deemed sufficient for the
purposes of Rule 803(2).
In this case Ms. Ortiz testified that, upon discovering that the bag was missing,
Clay became angry. R. 191 [282]. He was "yelling and swearing, and he was just pretty
much mad." R. 191 [287]. This evidence is sufficient to establish that discovering the bag
52

White. 502 U.S. at 356-57; Mires. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 244, f 20.

53

Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 8-47 (1996).
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was missing was a startling event to Clay.
With regard to the second requirement that the declarant must make the statement
while under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition, Hutto, 2000 UT
App 188, f 15, the record is supportive. Clay admitted that "[t]he bag was mine. That
stuff was mine." R. 191 [296]. He made this admission during the heat of excitement, as
evidenced by his yelling and swearing. R. 191 [287, 296]. Also, he made it immediately
after discovering that his bag of contraband was gone, R. 191 [282], and the stress of
excitement had not dissipated. Further, because admitting ownership of a bag containing
marijuana and stolen stereos exposes him to the danger of criminal charges, Clay's
admission strongly suggests that he was speaking in the heat of excitement without
"consideration of the consequences of the statement." Smith. 909 P.2d at 240. Thus,
Clay's admission meets the second requirement of the excited utterance test.
Finally, as required by the third element of the test, Clay's admission of ownership
of the bag relates to the discovery that his bag of contraband was missing. Hutto, 2000
UTApp 188,H 15.
The trial court's exclusion of Clay's statements was harmful. There is no other
evidence to suggest that someone other than Mr. Allred owned the bag, and such
evidence casts grave doubt on the identity of the owner. By itself, the exclusion of Clay's
statements was harmless error. However, coupled with the coercive tactics of the police
officers in extracting a confession from Mr. Allred, and the lack of any other direct
evidence linking Mr. Allred with the bag, the exclusion of Clay's statements provides
49

even more compelling reason to reverse. Cumulatively, the errors crippled the jury's
evaluation of the evidence supporting the conviction. Mr. Alfred's conviction, therefore,
should be reversed and this case should be remanded for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Alfred's conviction should be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial
because the trial court admitted evidence of a coerced confession. Alternatively, Mr.
Alfred's conviction should be reversed and this case remanded because the prosecutor
violated a pre-trial stipulation concerning stereos and tools found in the bag, and because
one officer testified that Mr. Alfred had been Mirandized on a prior occasion. Finally, a
reversal and remand is required because the trial court failed to admit excited utterance
evidence showing that another individual owned the bag.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

jftii

day of February, 2002.

irxLCT^r^x

IgATHER JOHNSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
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Utah Court of Apr

/

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

NOV 2 6 2001
PautetieSk*
Cleri* of the (

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER

v.
Case No. 20010113-CA
Tracy Michah Allred,
Defendant and Appellant
This case is before the court on Appellant's motion to
supplement the appeal record with a transcript of the
preliminary hearing. Appellee does not object to supplementing
the record.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to supplement the
record v/ith a transcript of the preliminary hearing is granted.
Appellant shall file a supplemental or amended brief within
thirty days of filing of the transcript with this court.
Appellee shall file an amended or supplemental brief within
thirty days of service of Appellee's supplemental or amended
brief.
-A
DATED this
day of November, 2001.
FOR THE COURT:

// ^

^

- -A

Russell W. Bench, Judge

ADDENDUM B

— >

HEATHER JOHNSON (6934)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-5444

I

CI. !;o! IhoLoMrt

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TRACY MICAH ALLRED,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE
RECORD AND STAY BRIEFING

Case No. 20010113-CA
Priority No. 2

COMES NOW, Defendant/Appellant Tracy Micah Allred ["Mr. Allred"], by and
through counsel, Heather Johnson, hereby submits this Motion to Supplement the Record
and Stay Briefing. Mr. Allred respectfully requests this Court to allow supplementation
of the record on the grounds that the preliminary hearing transcript, which may have been
considered by the trial court in ruling on Mr. Allred' motion to suppress evidence, was
not included in the original transmission of the record.
Appellee further requests that this Court stay the briefing schedule pending
resolution of this Motion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/d-6i

day of November, 2001

HEATHER JdttfisON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM C

MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
POBOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TRACY MICH AH ALLRED,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD AND
STAY BRIEFING

Case No. 20010113-CA

:

Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney General, counsel for the State of Utah, hereby
responds to defendant's motion to supplement the record and stay briefing, which was
filed after both parties filed their opening briefs. Defendant's motion suggests that while
defendant has no objection to the State rebriefing based on the newly supplemented
record, he has no intention of rebriefing his Brief of Appellant. For reasons detailed
below, the State urges that the more appropriate remedy at this late juncture is to strike
both parties' briefs and allow both parties to rebrief these issues based on the newly
supplemented and completed record.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute in a public park, an enhanced second degree felony (R3-5).

2.

Defendant moved to suppress his pre- and post-Miranda admissions (R3235).

3.

A pre-trial hearing on the motion was held on 5 September 2001, wherein
defendant called one witness (R188:3-16). In lieu of calling additional
witnesses defendant relied upon an unofficial transcript of the preliminary
hearing, which the trial court reviewed prior to ruling (R 188:3, 20-23, 2829).

4.

Although the unofficial preliminary hearing transcript was before the trial
court and was considered in the trial court's ruling denying the motion to
suppress, defendant never moved to have the unofficial copy admitted as an
exhibit or otherwise incorporated into the record (see R188:1-45).

5.

Following a one-day jury trial on 12 September 2000, defendant was
convicted as charged (R148).

6.

On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress;
however, defendant failed to request designation and transcription of the
preliminary hearing (see Rl 61-167). Instead, defendant's Brief of
Appellant challenges the trial court's pre-trial ruling by citing primarily to
subsequently adduced trial evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 8-11, 23-27

7.

Due to defendant's failure to secure a proper record on appeal, the State's
Brief of Appellee argued that this Court must presume the trial court's pretrial ruling was correct, and did not reach the merits of this issue. See Aple.
Br. at 10-16, 33 n.5.

8.

At this late juncture, after both parties have filed their opening briefs,
defendant has moved to supplement the record on appeal with the
preliminary hearing transcript, and to stay the time for the filing of his reply
brief. Motn. at 1.

2

ARGUMENT
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides in pertinent part as
follows:
The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order[.]
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing
the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the court executive a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and within the
same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court, and the
clerk of the appellate court. . . .
(2) Transcript is required of all evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to
such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated
to correct the appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of
the transcript.
Rule 11(e) clearly requires the appellant to include in the record a transcript of all
relevant evidence. Here, defendant provided an unofficial copy of the preliminary
hearing transcript to the trial court below in lieu of calling more than one witness at the
suppression hearing. Further, the unofficial preliminary hearing transcript served as the
basis for the trial court's findings and conclusions, which findings and conclusions
defendant challenges on appeal. However, nowhere in the Brief of Appellant does
defendant reference the preliminary hearing evidence. Rather, defendant supports his
challenge to the pre-trial ruling by citation to subsequently adduced trial evidence. Aplt.
Br. at 8-10, 23-27.
3

Upon reviewing defendant's brief and the record on appeal, counsel icali/cd that
although the unofficial transcript of the preliminary hearing was made available and was
relied upon by the trial court below, defendant never sought its admission as an exhibit or
otherwise incorporated the unofficial transcnpt into the record (R188 1-45) As set out in
the State's Bnef of Appellee, this failure renders the record inadequate to review
defendant's allegations of error and affirmance is proper on that ground See Aple Br at
10-16, and cases cited therein Indeed, "[w]hen crucial matters are not included in the
record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court " State
v. Theison, 709 P 2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985)
In response to the State's Brief of Appellee, defendant filed the instant motion to
supplement the record and stay briefing Defendant's motion indicates his non-objection
"to additional briefing by the State in light of the supplementation of the record," but
expresses no intention of rebnefing his Bnef of Appellant, once the record is completed
Motn at 5 It thus appears that defendant will address the newly supplemented record for
the first time in his reply bnef

This unique procedure unfairly forces the State to

anticipate what, if any arguments, defendant will ultimately ground in the evidence
actually before the trial court at the time of the pre-trial ruling See State v. Brown, 85^
P 2d 851, 853 n 1 (Utah 1992) (refusing to allow appellant to raise constitutional issue tor
first time in reply brief, recognizing that such a procedure would place the State "in the
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difficult position . . . of either missing the opportunity to brief the state constitutional
issue or having to construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue."). Brown demonstrates
the appellate courts' clear preference for reviewing issues "that both parties have had an
opportunity to brief." Id. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, given defendant's belated supplemental designation of record, filed
only after briefing by both parties, the State requests that both the Brief of Appellant and
the Brief of Appellee be stricken and that both parties rebrief the issues based on the
newly supplemented and completed record. While defendant suggests that his legal
arguments will remain unchanged, the State is entitled to have defendant's complete
arguments, with proper citations and evidentiary support, set out in defendant's opening
brief prior to filing its responsive brief.
DATED: fa November 2001.

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM D

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKH COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001910371 FS

TRACY MICAH ALLRED,
Defendant.
Custody: Prison

Judge:
Date:

PRESENT
Clerk:
chells
Prosecutor: JEFF HALL
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LISA J. REMAL

LESLIE A. LEWIS
January 5, 2001

ENTERED If! r :;!TrRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE

h

C\ I ( l / 0 \

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 30, 1978
Video
Tape Number:
12:43 PM
CHARGES

1. POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/12/2000 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
Criminal Sentence @J

Case No: 001910371
Date:
Jan 05, 2001

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The defendant be given credit for time served of 211 days to which
he is legally entitled to. Be given first consideration for
programs.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$10000.00
$9500.00
$425.00
$925.00
$10000.00
$9500.00
$425.00
$925.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $3 00.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDARS ASSOCIATION
Pay fine to The Court.
Dated this

CT day of
LESLIE A. LEWIS
District Court Judge

is

:

ADDENDUM E

Rule 404

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

cial Decisions — Criminal Law. 1987 Utah L.
Rev. 137.
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child
Abuse Litigation. 19K8 Utah L. Rev. 479.
Note, Enhancing Penalties by Admitting
"Bad Character" Evidence During the Guilt
Phase of Criminal Trials — Sfntc v. Rishnp,
1989 Utah L. Rev. 1013.
State v. Rimmasrh: Utah's Threshold Admissibility Standard for Child Sexual Abuse Profile
Evidence, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 641.
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part III,
1995 Utah L. Rev. 683.
Note, Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and Gruesome Photographs: Is a Picture Worth Anything
in Utah?, 1996 Utah I , Rov. 1131.
Evidence of Repeated Acts of Rape and Child
Molestation: Reforming Utah Law to Permit
the Propensity Inference, 1998 Utah L. Rev.
145.
J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y Law. — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
(1989).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 253 et seq.
C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 200.
AX.R. — Noncharacter witnesses in civil
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case, limiting number of, 5 A.L.R.3d 169.
Noncharacter witnesses in criminal case,
limiting number of, 5 A.L.R.3d 238.
Character or reputation witnesses, propriety
and prejudicial effect of trial court's limiting
number of, 17 A.L.R.3d 327.
Admissibility of polygraph or similar lie detector test results, or willingness to submit to
test, on issues of coverage under insurance
policy, or insurer's good-faith belief that claim
was not covered, 7 A.L.R.5th 143.
Sufficiency of evidence that witness in crim
inal case was hypnotized, for purposes of determining admissibility of testimony given under
hypnosis or of hypnotically enhanced testimony, 16A.L.R.5th 841.
Admissibility and prejudicial effect of evidence, in criminal prosecution, of defendants
involvement with witchcraft, satanism, or the
like, 18A.L.R.5th 804.
Admissibility of expert or opinion evidence of
battered-woman syndrome on issue of self-defense, 58 A.L.R.Sth 749.
Evidence offered by defendant at federal
criminal trial as inadmissible, under Rule 403
of Federal Rules of Evidence, on ground that
probative value is substantially outweighed by
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
or misleading the jury, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 700.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence t h a t the victim was the
first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — Provisions
of this rule apply to character evidence to prove
conduct, as distinguished from proof of character where character is an essential element of a
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was comparable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703 (Utah
1977) (character evidence as to the character of
the victim of a homicide was admissible to

rebut the defendant's contention that the deceased was the aggressor). One significant difference between this rule and Rule 47, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there is no
provision for the use of character evidence in
civil cases, except where character is the ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 authorized the use of character evidence in civil cases
not only on the ultimate issue but where otherwise substantively relevant. See Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive Use, 4 Utah
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know the facts is not statinp them under oath;
(2) that person is not present for cross-examination. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 19R. 310 R2d
388 (1957).
Chemical breath analysis.
Section 41-6-44.3, governing the admission of
chemical breath analysis, is a valid statutory
. ., ,
i i i
/^i.
exception to the hearsav rule. Lavton City v.
r»
i.i «>«i r»nj ncr ITI* U m A
mo^
Bennett, <4l P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
i. j
J nrc n n j 1 0 7 ^ / T U U m o m
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 127/ (Utah 1988).

the crime was not hearsay because it was not
presented for the truth of the matter, but to
explain why the officer took the investigative
steps that he did. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539
(Utah Ct. App. 1998)
p
„,. ,*"
, ,
.. , ,
,
The hearsav rule has as its declared purpose
.
•
.,
,. L .
the exclusion ofr evidence not4 subject
to cross^
*.
A.
4,
tL.
examination concerning the truthfulness of the
6
.
n o J
matters asserted. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986).

Al

Nonhearsay.
Police officer's recounting of victim's report of
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h Law Review. — Case Law Development: IV. Criminal Law and Procedure: R. The
Unconstitutionality of Statutes of Limitation
on Habeus Corpus Relief and the Need for
Reliability Findings for Child Victims' Out-ofCourt Statements, 1998 Utah L. Rev. 619.
J o u r n a l of C o n t e m p o r a r y Law. — Com-

ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
(1989).
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and applicat ion of child hearsay statutes, 71 A.L.R.5th 637.

Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant
immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant/s will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness'
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of

ooa
trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes
business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda,
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in an}7 form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel,
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics Records or data compilations, in any form, of
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a
public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record,
report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or
nonexistence of a m a t t e r of which a record, report, statement, or data
compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office
or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902,
or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages,
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or
other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony
or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law
to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of
the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings,
inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or
the like.
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of
the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by
each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record
of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of
documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in
property if the matter stated was relevant to (he purpose of the document,
unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been
inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and
relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.

(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established
as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption,
marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community or State or nation in which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among
associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere),
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not
including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for
purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect
admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries.
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by
evidence of reputation.
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Subdivision (1) is
comparable to Rule 63(4), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (2) is comparable to Rule
63(4)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v.
McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978).
Subdivision (3) is a similar provision to Rule
63(12), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (4) is comparable to Rule 63(12),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (5) had no express counterpart in
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), although Rule
63(4)(c) embodied some of the substance but
applied only where the declarant was unavailable. Decisions of the Utah Supreme Court

have recognized such an exception. Sagers v.
International Smelting Co., 50 Utah 423, 168
Pac. 105 (1917). The Utah courts have sanctioned the admission of the record of the past
recollection, contra to this rule. Sagers v. International Smelting Co., supra.
Subdivision (6) is comparable to Rule 63(13),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Former Rule
63(13) has been given broad application.
Bambrough v. Bothers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah
1976); State v. Marquez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah
1977); International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). The
rule allows computerized records and data to be
admitted. See Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696
(Utah 1978).

